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ABSTRACT 
The use of defamation law to protect corporate reputation is controversial. Australia, Canada 
and England and Wales have been at the centre of this debate, as although their defamation 
laws share many common characteristics, they adopt distinct approaches to allowing 
companies to sue in defamation. Consequently, in all three jurisdictions defamation law 
remains a cause of action that is relied upon by companies to protect their reputations. The 
primary concern of this article is the efficacy of these approaches,1 particularly in light of the 
reforms made to Australia’s defamation laws, adopted in 2020, that further restrict the right of 
corporations to sue in defamation. Ultimately, it argues that the Australian and English and 
Welsh approaches disproportionately disadvantage companies, particularly small ones, 
whereas the Canadian approach overprotects corporate reputation. It concludes by offering an 






*All websites accessed 3rd September 2020. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback. 
The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 In doing so, it builds on my earlier work in this area. See: Peter Coe, ‘A comparative analysis of the treatment 
of corporate reputation in Australia and the UK’ in Paul Wragg and András Koltay (eds.) Research Handbook 
on Comparative Privacy & Defamation Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), 253-269. 
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1. PROTECTING CORPORATE REPUTATION IN AUSTRALIA, ENGLAND AND 
WALES,2 AND CANADA 
The 17th of February 2003 was a watershed moment for Australian companies as, up until then, 
they had unfettered rights to sue for defamation. On that date, the New South Wales (NSW) 
Defamation Amendment Act 20023 introduced section 8A of the Defamation Act 1974. The 
effect of the provision was to abolish defamation as a cause of action for companies with ten 
or more employees, and no subsidiaries, at the time of the publication of the alleged defamatory 
material. As a NSW statute, the provision only applied to publications occurring within the 
state. It was not, at the time, of national application. Consequently, companies could still bring 
an action for defamation, even within NSW, for material published outside of the state.4  
The 1974 Act informed the National Uniform Defamation Law (NUDL), which was 
adopted by all Australian states and territories in 2006. As a result, section 9 of the Defamation 
Act 2005, and cognate legislation,5 mirrors section 8A of the 1974 Act. Thus, the legislation 
provides that companies cannot bring claims for defamation; albeit this is subject to exceptions, 
in that the NUDL entitles not-for-profit corporations, and companies employing less than ten 
full-time employees, to sue for defamation.6 
 In June 2018, the NSW government published a Statutory Review of the Defamation 
Act 2005.7 Although the Review found that the balance struck by section 9 continues to be 
appropriate, it recognised the importance of corporate reputation. Consequently, at the time, it 
left open the possibility of reform in that area, by recommending a review of section 9 to 
determine whether it should be amended.8 Its decision was based on two factors. Firstly, the 
submission from the NSW Bar Association, which reflects the arguments advanced below,9 
that section 9 should be expanded to permit all corporations to sue for defamation, on the basis 
 
2 Because section 17(2) of the Defamation Act 2013 makes it clear that the Act only applies to a very limited 
extent to Scotland this article focusses on the law as it applies in England and Wales. However, because some 
provisions extend to Scotland (see section 17(3)), the 2013 Act is a ‘United Kingdom Act’ and is referred to as 
such. 
3 Section 3, Schedule 1, Clause 5. 
4 Material that is read, heard, or seen outside NSW. 
5 Please note that in that the relevant Act and provisions in the Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory 
are section 121 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 and section 8 Defamation Act 2006 respectively. In all other states 
and territories, the relevant provision and Act is section 9 Defamation Act 2005 (NSW, Queensland (Qld), Victoria 
(Vic), South Australia (SA), Tasmania (Tas)). 
6 See section 121(2) Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002; section 8(2) Defamation Act 2006; section 9(2) Defamation 
Act 2005. The scope of these exceptions is explored in greater detail below. 
7 NSW Government, ‘Statutory Review Defamation Act 2005’ (June 2018). 
8 Ibid. [2.10] and Recommendation 2. 
9 See section 5. 
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that the reputations of businesses are also critically important, and are a legitimate interest, that 
needs to be protected.10 Secondly, that Australia’s approach does not correspond with the 
treatment of corporate reputation in other similar jurisdictions which have retained a right of 
businesses to sue in defamation. These jurisdictions include Canada and, ironically for the 
reasons explained in section 2, England and Wales (E&W).11  
Despite these arguments, reforms to Australia’s defamation laws proposed in 
November 2019 by the Council of Attorneys-General, and adopted in 2020, further restrict the 
right of corporations to sue in defamation.12 Under the reforms, the section 9 prohibition for 
companies with ten or more full-time employees will remain. Additionally, pursuant to a new 
section 10A(2) (this was section 7A(2) in previous iterations of the model amendments),13 
which mirrors the United Kingdom (UK) Defamation Act 2013’s section 1(1) and (2) serious 
harm and serious financial loss tests, companies that employ fewer than ten full-time 
employees, and are therefore ‘excluded’ from the section 9 prohibition by virtue of section 
9(2)(b), are prevented from bringing an action in defamation unless they can prove that the 
publication has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to the company’s reputation and 
serious financial loss. 14  
 Reflecting the treatment of corporate reputation in Australia prior to February 2003, 
Canada adopts an almost polar-opposite approach to the current Australian position, in that 
businesses are able to sue in defamation in essentially the same way as natural persons.15 Sitting 
somewhere in the middle of the two is E&W. As stated above, section 1(2) of the Defamation 
Act 2013 provides a qualification for the section 1(1) serious harm requirement for bodies 
trading-for-profit, in that to meet the serious harm threshold they need to demonstrate actual or 
likely serious financial loss. Thus, although E&W and Australia now share similar tests, unlike 
 
10 NSW Government above, n7, [2.4]. 
11 Ibid. [2.7]. “England and Wales” and “English and Welsh” is hereafter referred to as “E&W”. 
12 All Australian jurisdictions approved the proposed amendments to the Model Defamation Provisions at the 
July 2020 meeting of the Council of Attorneys-General, where it was ‘agreed that all jurisdictions will enact and 
commence the amendments as soon as possible.’ See: Council of Attorneys-General Communiqué 27th July 
2020 https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-07/Council%20of%20Attorneys-
General%20communiqué%20–%20July%202020.pdf.  
13 For example, see: Council of Attorneys-General, Model Defamation Amendment Provisions 2020, Report of 
the Australasian Parliamentary Council’s Committee, 12th November 2019, PCC-541 d15: 
https://www.justice.nsw.gov.au/justicepolicy/Documents/review-model-defamation-provisions/consultation-
draft-of-mdaps.pdf. 
14 Model Defamation Amendment Provisions 2020, section 10A(2): PCC-541 d30 (approved by the Council of 
Attorneys-General, 27th July 2020) (MDAP) 
https://pcc.gov.au/uniform/2020/Model_Defamation_Amendment_Provisions_2020.pdf.  
15 See generally: Hilary Young, ‘Rethinking Canadian Defamation Law as applied to corporate plaintiffs’ (2013) 
46(2) University of British Colombia Law Review 529-557. 
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the latter, there is no E&W provision akin to section 9 and, unlike section 10A(2), the section 
1(1) and 1(2) tests apply to all bodies that trade for profit, regardless of the number of full-time 
staff employed by the claimant company.  
Australian, Canadian, and E&W defamation laws share many common characteristics. 
However, in respect of allowing companies to use defamation to protect their reputations they 
adopt distinct approaches. Consequently, this article’s main  concern is not whether 
corporations should be allowed to use defamation to protect their reputations, as much has 
already been said on this subject16 and, indeed, this article recognises that other causes of action 
are available to corporate claimants. Rather, its primary purpose is to analyse the efficacy of 
each country’s approach to corporations using defamation as a cause of action. It will pay 
attention to small companies, particularly in respect of Australia and E&W, because of the 
challenges created by the former’s section 9 (and now section 10A(2)) of the 2005 Act, and the 
latter’s section 1(2) of the 2013 Act. As argued below, this is because these companies are 
critical, not only to our economies, but also to our societies.  
Section 2 provides an overview of the arguments advanced in all three jurisdictions for 
not allowing businesses to sue in defamation. Section 3 considers why it is imperative to society 
and democracy to be able to criticise and scrutinise corporations. In doing so it deals with the 
position in Canada, which arguably overprotects corporate reputation. Section 4 offers a 
rejoinder to the arguments advanced in sections 2 and 3: that corporate reputation is valuable 
to society as a whole and to individuals, and therefore merits protection. Section 5 analyses the 
efficacy of Australia’s fewer than ten employees’ exemption, and in section 6 alternative causes 
of action to defamation are considered. Section 7 considers the problems with establishing 
causation created by section 1(2) of the 2013 Act, and how these challenges could be replicated 
in Australia by virtue of section 10A(2). Finally, at section 8, it is asserted that the Australian 
and E&W approaches (including Australia’s introduction of the section 10A(1) and (2) serious 
harm and serious financial loss tests) disproportionately disadvantage corporations, particularly 
small ones, whereas the Canadian approach overprotects corporate reputation. Thus, the article 
offers an alternative way forward for these jurisdictions that, although not perfect, provides a 
better balance between these two valuable interests.    
 
 
16 See section 2 below. 
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2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST CORPORATIONS SUIING IN 
DEFAMATION 
In Australia, the rule abolishing the right of corporations to sue in defamation was based on 
arguments advanced by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General Working Group of State 
and Territory Officers on Uniform Defamation Laws (SCAG).17 SCAG was of the view that 
allowing corporations to sue in defamation provided them with an unfair advantage because: 18 
(i) defamation law had been developed to, and was concerned with, the protection of individual 
reputation, as opposed to the reputation of companies; (ii) companies have other causes of 
action and remedies to protect, and recover, any losses caused to their reputation available to 
them, albeit, as discussed in section 6, these causes of action19 are often more difficult to 
establish than defamation;20 (iii) rather than companies using defamation for its intended 
purpose of protecting their reputation, it could instead be used to silence public debate or 
criticism; (iv) companies are able to protect their reputations, and mitigate damage caused by 
defamatory statements, through public relations and advertising campaigns.  
SCAG’s points reflect the arguments that have been raised against allowing 
corporations to sue in defamation under E&W law. As demonstrated by the debates leading to 
the introduction of the 2013 Act, the fact that businesses were, and still are, able to sue in 
defamation to protect their reputations was, and remains, a controversial issue. 21 For instance, 
the Libel Reform Campaign argued for the exemption of large and medium-sized corporations 
from suing in defamation unless it could prove malicious falsehood.22 Similarly, the Ministry 
of Justice (MoJ)23 recognised that where a company sues an individual or non-governmental 
organisation, there may be an ‘inequality of arms’ between the parties,24 which is used to stifle 
criticism of the claimant company’s behaviour through the threat of protracted and costly legal 
proceedings.25 Consequently, the MoJ consultation supported the idea that E&W defamation 
 
17 SCAG Working Group of State and Territory Officers, ‘Proposal for Uniform Defamation Laws’ (July 2004) 
<https://www.justice.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/21636/uniform-defamation.pdf>. 
18 Ibid. 14–15. 
19 For example, the law of injurious (malicious) falsehood. 
20 David Rolph, ‘Corporations’ Right to Sue for Defamation: An Australian Perspective’ (2011) 22(7) 
Entertainment Law Review 195, 196; Matt Collins, ‘Protecting Corporate Reputations in the Era of Uniform 
National Defamation Laws’ (2008) 13 Media & Arts Law Review 447, 456–67. 
21 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘The Swing of the Pendulum: Reputation, Expression and the Re-Centring 
of English Libel Law’ (2012) 63(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 27, 54. 
22 Libel Reform Campaign, Free speech is not for sale, (2009) 6 <www.libelreform.org/the-report?start=5>. 
23 MoJ, Draft Defamation Bill: Summary of Responses to Consultation (CP(R)3/11, 2011). 
24 Ibid. [138]–[145]. 
25 See also: House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Press Standards, Privacy and Libel’ Second 
Report of Session 2009–10, Vol. 1, [177] and [178].  
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law should follow Australia and implement something akin to section 9.26 However, the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill heard evidence that removing the right to sue in 
defamation from companies might be incompatible with the European Convention on Human 
Rights.27 Thus, rather than following the Australian example, the day before the 2013 Act 
received Royal Assent, Parliament introduced the section 1(2) serious financial loss 
qualification.  
Although Canada does not prohibit companies from suing in defamation, or provide 
any E&W, and now Australian-type, qualification to the cause of action for businesses, the 
arguments advanced by SCAG have been used by Hilary Young to advocate for Canada to 
adopt a similar position to Australia and eliminate most corporations’ standing to sue in 
defamation.28 However, despite Young’s efforts, and unlike in Australia, where SCAG’s 
arguments were influential in the introduction of the section 9 prohibition (and latterly section 
10A(2)), this rationale has yet to be adopted in Canada.   
Despite SCAG’s arguments, and their adoption by UK and Canadian commentators, 
they are not uncontroversial. In addition to academic commentary on their validity from all 
three jurisdictions,29 they have been criticised by Philip Ruddock, the former Commonwealth 
Attorney-General,30 as well as the Business Council of Australia, which resisted the 2005 Act 
reform on the basis that the ability of companies to sue in defamation was necessary to ensure 
justice and equality before the law.31 The NSW Bar Association has also opposed, and 
campaigned for reform of, section 9.32 Consequently, there is no little irony in the fact that the 
NSW government’s Statutory Review of the 2005 Act used the treatment of corporate 
reputation in E&W as a persuading factor in its decision to recommend a review of section 9 
 
26 MoJ above, n23, [15]. 
27 Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, ‘Oral and Associated Written Evidence’ Vol. II (2010–12, HL 
203, HC 930-II) 18–19 (Lord Lester), 381–6 (Lord McNally).  
28 Young above, n15. The Canadian Supreme Court has also recognised that defamation law can be used by 
corporations to ‘chill’ speech. See: Grant v Torstar Corporation 2009 SCC 61; [2009] 3 SCR 640, [53]; 
Crookes v Newton 2011 SCC 47; [2011] 3 SCR 269, [36]. 
29 From the UK see: Peter Coe, ‘The Defamation Act 2013: We Need to Talk about Corporate Reputation’ (2015) 
Journal of Business Law 313, 319–20; Jan Oster, ‘The Criticism of Trading Corporations and their Right to Sue 
for Defamation’ (2011) 2 Journal of European Tort Law 255 cf.  David Acheson, ‘Corporate Reputation under 
the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2018) 10(1) Journal of Media Law 49. From Australia see: Rolph 
above, n20; Collins above, n20. From Canada see: Young above, n15; Young, ‘The Canadian Defamation Action: 
An Empirical Study’ (2017) 95 The Canadian Bar Review 591-630. 
30 See generally Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department (AGD), ‘Revised Outline of a Possible 
National Defamation Law’ July 2004. 
31 Hugh Morgan, ‘Attack on Integrity Lacks Moral Standing’ (The Australian Financial Review, 5 April 2005) 
63. 
32 For example, see NSW Government above, n7, [2.4]. 
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as, prior to the introduction of the 2013 Act, E&W very nearly followed Australia by 
prohibiting companies from bringing a claim in defamation. The enactment and 
commencement of 10A(2) means that companies with fewer than ten employees will only be 
able to sue in defamation if they are able to prove serious harm by demonstrating actual or 
likely serious financial loss. Companies with ten or more employees remain barred from suing 
in defamation. Thus, as stated in section 1, this article argues that the section 9 prohibition and 
the section 10A(2) qualification disproportionately disadvantage companies and that, in 
relation to smaller entities, the problems with the 2013 Act’s section 1(2) qualification are 
likely to be replicated by the application of section 10A(2).  
 
3. THE VALUE IN BEING ABLE TO CRITICISE CORPORATIONS AND THE 
‘CANADIAN PROBLEM’ 
Facebook’s role in recent elections, and the ensuing Cambridge Analytica scandal, and the 
exponential growth of Amazon are just two examples of the influence that large companies 
have on the economy, society and politics. 33 Accordingly, from an E&W perspective, in Jameel 
v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl Baroness Hale stated that ‘the power wielded by multi-
national corporations is enormous and growing’ and that the ability to criticise large companies 
‘may be at least as important in a democracy as the freedom to criticise the government.’34 
Equally, small companies, and their leaders or owners, often play an influential role, and are 
ingrained, within their local communities.35 Due to the influence of companies in the public 
sphere there is a clear link between speech about corporations with truth finding and democratic 
 
33 Amazon was founded by Jeff Bezos in 1994. At the time of writing Amazon was worth $1 trillion, with 
Bezos’ net worth being $171.6 billion. B. Hoyle, ‘Bezos breaks his own wealth record’ The Times, 4th July 
2020, 14. By way of further example of the influence of large companies in the UK generally, in 2010 the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government announced the creation of a Business Advisory 
Group, consisting of industry leaders, to assist the Prime Minister and senior ministers with ‘high level’ business 
and economic advice. The group operated until 2016: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/business-advisory-
group-announced. In 2017 the UK government set up a similar group to advise on Brexit: https://www.ft. 
com/content/67001056-5b39-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b. And, in 2020, Liz Truss, the International Trade 
Secretary, launched eleven trade advisory groups, from a variety of industries, to provide advice ‘that will be 
used to help inform the government’s negotiating position’ during trade talks with other countries: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/liz-truss-brings-key-industries-closer-to-trade-negotiations. 
34 [2007] 1 AC 359, [158]. Similarly, in the United States, Justice Scalia has stated that corporations are the 
‘principal agents of the modern economy.’ See: Citizens United v Federal Election Commission 558 US 310 
(2010), 929.  
35 The UK’s Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) states that: ‘Small businesses and the self-employed are at the 
heart of our communities. This is evident in their willingness and ability to employ those furthest from the labour 




discourse:36 as Devan Desai has stated, the conduct of businesses is very often a matter of 
public importance37 that, as the Canadian courts have recognised, goes beyond the commercial 
sphere38 and is integral to social and political decision-making,39 drawing attention to corporate 
conduct that raises issues of public interest40 and consumer protection.41  
Therefore, ensuring that the ability to criticise the conduct of companies of all sizes is 
protected is imperative to democracy and the health of our societies.42 However, as argued in 
the following section corporate reputation is itself valuable to these interests. Ultimately, an 
appropriate balance needs to be found between being able to criticise companies and companies 
being able to protect their reputation.  The remainder of this article will argue that, as it stands, 
this balance is not being appropriately struck in all three jurisdictions by the respective 
defamation laws.43 In Australia and E&W, the underlying rationale of section 9 and the new 
section 10A(2), and section 1(2) of the 2013 Act respectively, was to prevent companies from 
‘chilling’ free speech. Yet, inadvertently, their effects are perhaps more acutely felt by smaller 
companies without the resources to protect their reputation in other, non-legal, ways.44 At the 
opposing end of the spectrum, in Canada, companies of all sizes are disproportionately 
protected, which has resulted in the controversial use by corporations of SLAPP (Strategic 
Lawsuit Against Public Participation) law suits. 
The Canadian problem 
The position in Canada differs to Australia and E&W in that Canadian defamation law treats 
corporate claimants in the same way as individuals, meaning there is no bar on, or qualification 
to, companies bringing a claim in defamation. This means that Canadian companies of any size 
are not faced with the same challenges that are explored in the following sections of this article 
as companies in Australia and E&W.  
 
36 Young above, n15, 555. 
37 Devan R. Desai, ‘Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure Doctrine’ (2013) 98 
Minnesota Law Review 455, 462-466. 
38 R v Guingard 2002 SCC 14, [2002] 1 SCR 472, [23].  
39 Irwin Toy Limited v Quebec (AG) [1989] 1 SCR 927, 970-971. 
40 Daishowa Incorporated v Friends of the Lubicon (1998), 158 DLR (4th) 699, 78 ACWS (3d) 861, 729-730. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Douglas A. Kysar, ‘Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of 
Consumer Choice’ (2004) 118(2) Harvard Law Review 525, 535. See generally: Chris Dent and Andrew 
Kenyon, ‘Defamation Law’s Chilling Effect: A Comparative Analysis of Australian and US Newspapers’ 
(2004) 9(2) Media & Arts Law Review 89. 
43 Other causes of action are available. Some of these are considered in section 6 below. 
44 See section 4 below.  
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As argued above, being able to appropriately criticise companies is fundamentally 
important to society and democracy. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) decision in 
Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto45 that, in applying the values of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, found the common law of defamation to be neither unduly restrictive 
nor inhibiting of free speech, is troubling in the context of corporate claimants and the country’s 
prevalence of SLAPP litigation. Within this arena arguably the Canadian position goes too far, 
and disproportionately protects corporate reputation to the detriment of free speech. SLAPP 
litigation, which is typically (although not exclusively) used by companies to prevent criticism 
that may or may not be defamatory, 46 present a particular problem in Canada, where they are 
used by companies to stifle criticism,47 rather than to vindicate reputations or obtain awards for 
damage that has actually been suffered.  
In recent years provincial anti-SLAPP laws have been introduced. For example, British 
Columbia introduced the Protection of Public Participation Act 2019, which mirrors the 
provisions found in Ontario’s Courts of Justice Act 1990, that were introduced by the 
Protection of Public Participation Act 2015.48 Both pieces of legislation provide a preliminary 
pretrial procedure for a defendant to seek dismissal of a claim where the litigation arises out of 
a defendant’s expression on a matter of public interest.49 The initial burden of proof is on the 
defendant to satisfy the judge on the balance of probabilities that the proceeding arises from an 
expression made by them that relates to a matter of public interest.50 If this ‘threshold 
requirement’51 is overcome, the burden shifts onto the claimant to establish on the balance of 
probabilities that, firstly the proceeding has substantial merit52 and, secondly, that the defendant 
has no valid defence in the proceeding.53 In addition to the ‘merits-based hurdle,’54 the claimant 
has to clear a ‘public interest hurdle’55 by satisfying the judge on the balance of probabilities 
 
45 [1995] 2 SCR 1130; Goddard v Day (2000) 194 DLR 559. 
46 From the US see: Gordon v Marrone 590 NYS 2d 649, 656 (1992). See also: Penelope Canan and George W. 
Pring ‘Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches’ (1988) 22(2) Law & Society Review 385, 387.  
47 Susan Lott, ‘Corporate Retaliation Against Consumers: The Status of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation (SLAPPs) in Canada’ (2004) https://www.piac.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/slapps.pdf; Young 
above, n14, 559-560; https://www.wcel.org/blog/new-victory-anti-slapp-law-bittersweet; 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/legislature-passes-anti-slapp-1.5049927.  
48 See sections 137.1 to 137.5 of the Courts of Justice Act 1990. 
49 Courts of Justice Act 1990 section 137.1; Protection of Public Participation Act 2019 section 2. 
50 Ibid. section 137.1(3); section 4(1)(a) and (b). 
51 1704604 Ontario Limited v Pointes Protection Association 2018 ONCA 685, [50]-[56] per Doherty J.A. 
52 Courts of Justice Act 1990 section 137.1(4)(a)(i); Protection of Public Participation Act 2019 section 
4(2)(a)(i). 
53 Ibid. section 137.1(4)(a)(ii); section 4(2)(a)(ii). 
54 1704604 above, n51, [67]-[84]. 
55 Ibid. [85]-[101]. 
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that the harm likely to be, or that has been, suffered by them as a result of the defendant’s 
expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to 
continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression.56 Finally, pursuant to the 
costs regime introduced by the statutes, if a defendant is successful on the motion, the judge 
should start from the premise that the defendant should receive costs on both the motion and 
in the proceeding on a full indemnity basis, as opposed to the usual partial indemnity basis. 57   
This legislation, and its subsequent interpretation by the Ontario Court of Appeal 
(OCA), and more recently by the SCC, in 1704604 Ontario Limited v Pointes Protection 
Association,58 which addressed the limits of the provisions, raises several issues. The first 
relates specifically to the OCA’s and SCC’s interpretations of the statute. In relation to the 
public interest test in the threshold requirement, which is not defined by the statutes, Doherty 
J.A., in delivering the OCA’s unanimous judgment,59 found that the concept is ‘broad’60 and 
that the determination must be made ‘objectively, having regard to the context in which the 
expression was made and the entirety of the relevant communication.’61 He held that while 
‘there is no exhaustive list of topics’62 that can be considered ‘public interest,’ certain topics 
inevitably will be63 and that a matter of public interest has to be distinguished ‘from a matter 
about which the public is merely curious or has a prurient interest.’64 In expanding on this, Côté 
J., in giving the SCC’s unanimous judgment, stated that the quality of the expression, and 
motivation behind it, are relevant to the test, and that the expression may be assessed with 
regard to the core values underlying free speech, ‘such as the search for truth, participation in 
political decision making, and diversity in forms of self-fulfilment and human flourishing.’ 65 
Thus, although the threshold requirement is not an onerous test for the defendant to overcome, 
neither, it is submitted for the reasons below, are the merits-based and public interest hurdles 
imposed on the claimant.   
 
56 Courts of Justice Act 1990 section 137.1(4)(b); Protection of Public Participation Act 2019 section 4(2)(b). 
57 Ibid. section 137.1(7); section 7(1).  
58 2018 ONCA 685; 2020 SCC 22; Fortress Real Developments Inc. v. Rabidoux 2018 ONCA 686; Platnick v. 
Bent 2018 ONCA 687; Veneruzzo v. Storey 2018 ONCA 688; Armstrong v. Corus Entertainment Incorporated 
2018 ONCA 689; Able Translations Ltd. v. Express International Translations Incorporated 2018 ONCA 690. 
59 Ibid. (1704604). Brown and Huscroft JJ.A concurring.  
60 Ibid. [65]. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. [59]. 
63 Ibid. Such as the ‘conduct of governmental affairs and the operation of the courts.’  
64 Ibid. [61] 
65 2020 SCC 22, [73]-[82]. 
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In respect of the first stage of the merits-based hurdle Doherty J.A. was clear that the 
purpose of section 137.1 was not to introduce de facto summary judgment motions.66 Rather, 
they are ‘screening’ motions67 that should only involve determining whether, on an 
examination of the motion record, ‘there are reasonable grounds to believe that a reasonable 
trier could accept the evidence.’68 Accordingly, the role of the motion judge is to determine 
whether it ‘could reasonably be said, on an examination of the motion record, that the claim 
has substantial merit.’69 In the SCC’s view this means that the proceeding must ‘have a real 
prospect of success…that, while not amounting to a demonstrated likelihood of success, tends 
to weigh more in favour of the [claimant].’ 70 In the OCA, Doherty J.A. stated that the second 
element of this hurdle does not require the claimant to address all of the defendant’s possible 
defences and prove that none have any validity.71 Rather, according to Côté J. in the SCC, it 
places an evidentiary burden on the defendant to advance any proposed ‘valid defence’ which 
would then place an onus on the claimant to demonstrate only that there are ‘grounds to believe’ 
that none of those defences  ‘have a real prospect of success’.72 According to both Doherty J.A. 
in the OCA and Côté J. in the SCC  the final, public interest hurdle, is the ‘heart’ or the ‘crux’ 
of Ontario’s anti-SLAPP legislation.’73 Although the harm to the claimant can be monetary or 
non-monetary, they must provide some basis on which the harm or potential harm can be 
assessed.74 Consequently, if the claimant overcomes the merits hurdle, a ‘common sense 
reading of the claim, supported by sufficient evidence to draw a causal connection between the 
challenged expression and damages that are more than nominal will often suffice.’75 It therefore 
appears that where a claimant is able to sufficiently demonstrate serious harm resulting from 
the expression, even at a preliminary stage, this hurdle will be cleared.  
Secondly, and more broadly, it highlights the fact that despite the problem of SLAPP 
litigation receiving attention from academic commentators76 and provincial governments, at 
 
66 2018 ONCA 685, [78]. 
67 Ibid. [73]-[74]. 
68 Ibid. [75]. 
69 Ibid. 
70 2020 SCC 22, [49], per Côté J. 
71 2018 ONCA 685[83]. 
72  2020 SCC 22, [55]-[60]. 
73 2018 ONCA 685 [86]; 2020 SCC 22, [18], [3], [33], [48], [61], [82]. 
74 Ibid. (2018 ONCA 685), [88]. 
75 Ibid. [90]. 
76 Lott above, n47; Young above, n15. See also: Vincent Pelletier et al ‘Strategic Lawsuits against Public 





the time of writing, in addition to Ontario and British Columbia, only Quebec77 has introduced 
similar legislation that operates as a safeguard against these suits.78 Finally, and leading on 
from the second point, the problem presented by SLAPP suits is not confined to corporations 
but is more acute with corporate claimants because of the ‘inequality of resources and power 
between most corporations and most individuals or small organisations who are likely to be 
subject to these suits.’79 Unlike defamation, which has not been used by larger companies to 
stifle criticism to the extent that was perhaps feared,80 it seems that in Canada, the threat of 
defamation action, made through the vehicle of SLAPP litigation, is employed by larger 
companies as a reputation management tool to achieve what they cannot achieve in law: to 
prevent critical speech that has not been proven to be defamatory.81 SLAPP suits are effective 
at achieving this because they put defendants into a ‘catch-22’ situation: they either have to 
incur what can be the significant cost of defending the litigation, knowing that even if they are 
successful, a costs award may not cover the full expense of their legal fees,82 or they retract 
their statement, or choose not to publish what could be valuable public interest speech about a 
particular corporation.  
4. THE VALUE OF CORPORATE REPUTATION  
(a) Confining defamation law to individuals and the value of corporate reputation 
Arguably, the proposition that the law of defamation should only be concerned with individual 
reputation is fuelled by the problematic precondition that defamation actions by corporations 
are dependent upon those companies having a reputation that can be damaged as, Jan Oster 
states, reputation is, ‘at first glance’, a characteristic attributed to individuals.83 Despite 
Canadian corporations enjoying the same rights to sue in defamation as individuals, this 
argument has gained traction there by virtue of the SCC’s emphasis on dignitary rather than 
proprietary aspects of reputation.84 This is because, in its treatment of reputation when 
 
77 On the 4th of June 2009 an Act to amend the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure to prevent improper use of the 
courts and promote freedom of expression and citizen participation in public debate came into force. The Act 
amended article 54 in Chapter III of Title II of Book I of the Code by giving judges powers to ‘impose sanctions 
for improper use of procedures.’ 
http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=5&file=2009C12A.PDF.  
78 Similar legislation has been proposed in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick but in both provinces the Bills were 
not passed.  
79 Young above, n15, 561.  
80 See section 4. 
81 Young above n15, 562. 
82 Although it appears that in Ontario and British Columbia this is not the case (see above, n57). 
83 Oster above, n29, 258. 
84 Robert C. Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution’ (1986) 74 
California Law Review 691. 
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balancing the right with freedom of expression, it has consistently described the importance of 
reputation from a dignity and autonomy perspective, rather than in terms of property.85 
Despite these arguments in favour of limiting the tort to individuals, defamation law is 
used to intervene to protect corporate reputation in all three jurisdictions. In Australia, during 
debates prior to the introduction of the 2005 Act, Philip Ruddock was of the view that although 
corporations differ from natural persons in the type of reputation they have, they nevertheless 
have reputations that can be assailed. Consequently, in his view, providing companies with the 
mechanisms to protect their reputation is also important.86 In E&W, in Jameel, Lords Bingham, 
Hope and Scottall agreed that corporate reputation is a thing of value, 87 with Lord Hoffman 
stating that it is an asset as it attracts customers.88 In Dixon v Holden it was held that reputation 
is potentially more valuable than other property.89 Similarly, in RWDSU, Local 558 v Pepsi-
Cola Canada Beverages (West) Limited the SCC found that ‘protection from economic harm 
is an important value capable of justifying limitations on freedom of expression.’90 
The arguments in favour of this approach are inter alia, the fact that Robert Post’s 
reputation as property provides a conceptual basis for corporations to sue in defamation91 to 
protect corporate ‘goodwill’,92 and the ‘value’ attributed to corporate reputation, not only to 
companies themselves, but to communities within which they operate, and the wider economy. 
In respect of the former, according to Post, there are: ‘…aspects of modern defamation law that 
can be understood only by reference to the concept of reputation as property, as, for example, 
the fact that corporations and other inanimate entities can sue for defamation.’93 Post’s thesis 
that reputation as property provides a conceptual foundation for companies to sue in defamation 
corresponds with Oster’s view, who has argued that ‘it is a distinctive feature of a company’s 
suit for defamation that it may exclusively be explained by the conception of reputation as 
 
85 Young above, n15, 548-549; Grant v Torstar Corporation 2009 SCC 61; [2009] 3 SCR 640, [58], [111]; WIC 
Radio Limited v Simpson 2008 SCC 40; [2008] 2 SCR 420, [2]; R v Lucas [1998] 1 SCR 439; 157 DLR (4th) 
423, 463.  
86 AGD above, n30, 38–39. As discussed below, the need for such a mechanism is particularly acute in the context 
of smaller companies who do not have the means to deal with attacks on their reputation. 
87 n34 above, [91].  
88 Ibid. [26] per Lord Bingham; [101] per Lord Hope; [120] per Lord Scott. See also Derbyshire County Council 
v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534, 547. 
89 Dixon v Holden (1868–69) LRR 7 Eq 488, 492. 
90 2002 SC 8; [2002] 1 SCR 156, [72].  
91 As noted above this does not seem to be the case in Canada.  
92 Economic loss as a result of a depreciation in corporate goodwill is discussed in section 7 below. 
93 Post above, n84, 696; Oster above, n 29, 278. 
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property.’94 Thus, the value of reputation is determined by the market in the same way as any 
property loss is measured.95 As Dario Milo suggests, the notion of reputation as property 
reflects the image of the market society; individuals, he argues, are connected through the 
institution of the market.96 Accordingly, Post advances the argument that the concept of 
reputation as property is reputation in the marketplace; a notion of reputation that: ‘can be 
understood as a form of intangible property akin to goodwill…acquired as a result of an 
individual’s efforts and labour.’97 Hence, if reputation is injured, the resulting loss is financially 
quantifiable.98 The argument for the wider value of corporate reputation is that the performance 
of economies, and the continued social and economic development of communities, are linked 
to the success of corporations of all sizes.99 As the European Court of Human Rights 
acknowledged in Steel and Morris v United Kingdom,100 ‘in addition to the public interest in 
open debate about business practices, there is a competing interest in protecting the commercial 
success and viability of companies, for the benefit of shareholders and employees, but also for 
the wider economic good.’101  
(b) Small companies and the ‘flawed’ ‘inequalities of arms’ argument 
There is a further, albeit controversial argument, in favour of allowing companies to sue in 
defamation that is significant to smaller companies: the arguments advanced in section 2 above 
by commentators and pressure groups in all three jurisdictions in favour of not allowing 
corporations to sue in defamation were and are focused almost exclusively on large companies 
and, in any event, are potentially inflated. According to Young, in Canada, ‘defamation law 
has become a weapon in [corporations’] brand management arsenal.’102 However, in a later 
article setting out the results of a quantitative study looking at defamation actions brought by 
corporate claimants between 1973 and 1983 and 2003 and 2013 she acknowledges that the 
percentage of corporate defamation cases have in fact ‘not increased greatly over the time 
periods examined’ and, in any event, they resulted in liability ‘significantly less often in the 
 
94 Ibid. (Oster) 259. See also: The Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Company (Limited) v Hawkins (1859) 4 
Hurlstone & Norman Exchequer Reports (H&N) 87 per Pollock CB, 90. 
95 Oster above, n29, 259; Dario Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2008), 27. 
96 Ibid. (Milo). 
97 Post above, n84, 693. 
98 Milo above, n95, 27. 
99 John Smythe et al. Corporate Reputation: Managing the New Strategic Asset (Random House 1992) 4.  
100 (2005) 41 EHRR 22. 
101 Ibid. [94]. In the UK, see section 172(1)(d) of the Companies Act 2006, which requires directors to take 
account of ‘the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment’. 
102 Young above, n15, 560-563. 
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later period than in the earlier period.’103 Similarly, in Australia, a perceived, although not 
necessarily actual, increase in inappropriate corporate defamation actions was used to justify 
the decision to prohibit businesses with ten or more employees from suing in defamation.104 In 
the UK, as we have seen above, prior to the introduction of the 2013 Act, arguments were 
advanced that defamation law was being used by companies to stifle criticism, thereby creating 
an ‘inequality of arms’ between deep-pocketed corporate claimants and defendants.105 
Undoubtedly, in some cases this was, and remains, true, as demonstrated by the use of SLAPP 
litigation in Canada. However, evidence suggests that large companies seldom brought 
defamation claims prior to the introduction of the 2013 Act and have continued with this 
practice since the Act came into force.106 This is because large corporations can call on 
alternative, non-legal, methods, such as ‘counter publicity’ campaigns and expensive 
‘reputation insurance’, 107 to protect their reputations and to mitigate any damage caused. To 
the contrary, as observed by SCAG, smaller companies do not have the same financial, 
marketing and public relations resources as large companies to absorb attacks on their 
reputation.108 Although it can be expensive, for these smaller companies, defamation provides 
a mechanism to protect their reputation that, for the reasons discussed in section 6 is, in some 
cases, preferable to other causes of action.109 Thus, it is submitted that the arguments advanced 
in all three jurisdictions relating to corporate defamation claims being used to stifle free speech 
are not entirely without basis, yet are flawed. The cause of the concern was, and is, large 
companies, yet it seems as though they tend not to use defamation as they have alternative 
methods at their disposal. On the other hand, smaller companies, who have been largely 
forgotten about in these debates, and may be of more limited means than defendants, do not 
always have these resources at their disposal. Therefore, although defamation is by no means 
a ‘cheap option’, they are more likely to rely on it as a cause of action which, in E&W, for the 
 
103 Young above, n29, 594-595.   
104 Submission to the Joint Parliamentary Committee Appointed to Conduct Pre-Legislative Scrutiny of the 
Draft Defamation Bill (12 July 2011), 3 http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au; Rolph, ‘A Critique of the National, 
Uniform Defamation Laws’ (2008) 16:3 Torts Law Journal 207, 217. 
105 See section 2. 
106 Brett Wilson LLP, ‘Defamation Act 2013: A summary and overview six years on’ Inforrm 29th January 2020 
https://inforrm.org/2020/01/29/defamation-act-2013-a-summary-and-overview-six-years-on-part-1-sections-1-
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107 Paul. J. Davies ‘Insurance for groups to restore reputations’ The Financial Times 8th May 2011 
https://www.ft.com/content/8a61e98a-79a3-11e0-86bd-00144feabdc0.   
108 NSW Government above, n7, [2.8]. 
109 Despite a claimant’s prospect of success, litigation of any kind can be damaging, and can cause more damage 
to the claimant than the alleged defamatory statement. This is illustrated by the McLibel litigation (McDonald's 
Corporation v Steel & Morris [1997] EWHC QB 366) which became the longest libel case in UK history. 
Although McDonalds ‘won’, the victory was pyrrhic, in that it cost them approximately £10 million and was 
considered a public relations disaster. See generally: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4266741.stm.  
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reasons explored in section 7, is now potentially far more difficult for them to employ due to 
the section 1(2) qualification. Similarly, in Australia, the section 9 prohibition and the section 
10A(2) qualification, expose small companies to attacks on their reputation.110  
In conclusion, in many situations, a company’s reputation is vital, not only for its 
prosperity, but also its existence. As discussed in section 1, this is one of the factors that 
encouraged the NSW Government to recommend a review of section 9.111 Moreover, as 
advanced above, the ‘health’ of a company’s reputation can directly affect the overall state of 
the business which, in turn, can have a significant impact on the local community in which it 
is based, regardless of its size, having the potential to indirectly effect many individuals. As a 
result, it is arguable that the reputation of businesses is at least as important as the reputation 
of individuals.112 
5. WHY AUSTRALIA’S FEWER THAN TEN EMPLOYEES EXEMPTION IS FLAWED 
As explained in section 1, Australia’s NUDL exempts companies with fewer than ten 
employees from the general prohibition that corporations cannot sue in defamation,113 (albeit, 
section 10A(2)’s adoption means that this exemption is qualified by the serious harm and 
serious financial loss tests) a position that pressure groups and commentators have argued 
should be followed in E&W and Canada.114 This limitation on the right to sue, based upon a 
company’s number of employees, can be attacked on a number of fronts. 
Firstly, although the law is full of arbitrary cut-offs, which are sometimes unavoidable, 
or at least the best option available, there is force in Ruddock’s argument that a limitation based 
on employee numbers is arbitrary, and likely to give rise to anomalies.115 This is demonstrated 
by: (i) SCAG’s view that corporations are able to protect, and mitigate damage caused to, their 
reputations by virtue of public relations and advertising campaigns, and; (ii) The fact that 
SCAG’s decision to allow small companies to retain the right to sue for defamation was based 
on the premise that ‘they may be disproportionately affected by a defamatory publication and 
less likely to weather its consequences.’116 This premise is self-defeating; SCAG says that it 
recognises that smaller companies may not be able to protect, and deal with attacks on, their 
 
110 See section 7. 
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113 See Section 121(2) Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002; Section 8(2) Defamation Act 2006; Section 9(2) Defamation 
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reputation in the same way as larger companies, yet it decided to set the number of employees 
at which the limitation applies to ten. Thus, small companies are left exposed by the current 
law, and will remain ‘disproportionately affected.’ For example, a ‘small’ company with ten 
employees would, prior to the introduction of section 10A(2), be prevented from bringing an 
action in defamation. Its commencement means that the company would still be barred from 
suing in defamation unless it could prove serious harm and serious financial loss which, as 
argued in section 7 below, presents further, possibly insurmountable, challenges, for companies 
of all sizes, but would be particularly problematic for smaller companies.  
This anomaly is particularly concerning when one considers that small organisations 
are not only, very often, inextricably linked to, and embedded within, their local 
communities117 but, as explained in section 4, are not able to absorb attacks on their reputation 
in the same way as larger companies, as was recognised by SCAG.118 Consequently, a 
statement that negatively affects the reputation of a small company could cause it severe or 
even fatal damage. Accordingly, in Ruddock’s opinion: ‘[i]t is difficult to see why a family 
business with, say, eleven employees should be forbidden to sue while another business with 
eight employees should not.’119  
A further flaw in nominating an arbitrary number to determine if a company can or 
cannot sue in defamation is that it is not inconceivable in today’s world of boutique technology 
companies and social media influencers to have a company consisting of less than ten 
employees that is considerably wealthier than a ‘larger’ defendant. Furthermore, it seems unfair 
that, for example, a wealthy technology company employing eight people would be able to sue 
in defamation (subject to it satisfying section 10A(2) ), whilst a family business employing ten 
people would be prevented from doing so by section 9. The short-sightedness of section 9 in 
relation to its practical application within a modern business context is further demonstrated 
by its focus on full-time employees and its failure to account for casual/temporary employment 
and the gig economy, which are not only widespread but are increasing.120 This undermines 
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the provision’s validity, as in this context it is not fit for purpose for how many businesses 
operate now, let alone how they will operate in the future. This has been recognised by the 
Council of Attorneys-General and, as result, it will be rectified by the adoption of the Model 
Defamation Amendment Provisions. Schedule 1[4] inserts a definition of employee that 
excludes volunteers but includes ‘any individual (whether or not they are a contractor) who is 
engaged in the day to day operations of the corporation and who are subject to the control and 
direction of the corporation.’121  
 Secondly, although larger companies do often have alternative, non-legal, resources to 
deal with attacks on their reputation, as suggested in section 4 they still have a reputation that 
is worthy of legal protection because of its value, not only to the company itself, but also its 
community, employees and other stakeholders. Thus, in this regard, the size of the company is 
irrelevant. Why should a company, regardless of its size (if it has ten or more full-time 
employees), have to spend more money on non-legal resources to deal with an attack on its 
reputation, which do not have the ultimate effect of vindicating the company’s reputation in 
the same way as the remedies available pursuant to successful defamation proceedings? 
SCAG’s response to this question is that these companies have alternative causes of action 
available to them, such as the law of malicious falsehood. However, as recognised by Ruddock, 
and will be discussed at section 6, these causes of action, although available to corporate 
claimants, are not always as appropriate as defamation.122  
 Thirdly, for the purposes of defamation law, publication happens when the imputation 
in question is read, heard or seen.123 Pursuant to section 9(1) of the 2005 Act, the time at which 
the respective company’s number of employees is to be assessed to ascertain whether it can 
sue for defamation is the ‘time of publication.’ This creates an anomaly by virtue of the fact 
that where a defamatory imputation is published over a period of time, or is accessible 
indefinitely on the Internet or via social media, a company with a variable or transient 
workforce, which is very often the case with smaller companies who may take on temporary 
staff during busy periods,124 may have rights in respect of some, but not all publications, of 
identical matter.125 This is particularly concerning when considering the proliferation of review 
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122 AGD above, n30, 38–39. 
123 Duke of Brunswick v Harmer (1849) 14 QB 185, 117 ER 75; Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos 4 and 
5) [2002] QB 783, 817–818; Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, 194 ALR 433. 
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sites, such as Google Reviews and Tripadvisor, and the lasting damage that can be done to 
small companies by untrue and adverse comments left on these sites.126 It seems unfair that a 
small company that happens to have taken on extra staff at the time that an untrue and damaging 
review is published, thereby temporarily taking it over the ten employee threshold is, by virtue 
of section 9(1), unable to use defamation to vindicate its reputation, leaving it exposed to 
potentially long-term damage.   
 Finally, section 9(2)(b) of the 2005 Act determines that the right of companies with 
fewer than ten employees to sue in defamation does not apply if the company is related to 
another company pursuant to section 50 of the Corporations Act 2001,127 regardless of whether, 
between them, they have less than ten employees. There are many situations in which small 
businesses will be related to each other yet will employ under ten employees. For example, a 
small, family-run chain of newsagents or takeaway restaurants could, conceivably, fall foul of 
this gap in the law, leaving them exposed, with no legitimate means of reputational protection.  
 
6. ALTERNATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION 
SCAG advanced the view that corporations do not need to rely on defamation to protect their 
reputation, as other causes of action are available that offer adequate protection and 
remedies.128 To the contrary, for the reasons set out below, it is submitted that these alternative 
causes of action are not always appropriate. Indeed, in Ruddock’s view, restricting companies 
to using causes of action, such as injurious falsehood, and remedies under the Competition and 
 
126 Michael Douglas, ‘Before you write that scathing online review, beware of defamation’ The Conversation 19th 
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Consumer Act 2010, impose an onerous and unreasonable burden upon them that,129 arguably, 
results in inequality and injustice.  
As stated by David Rolph, historically, allowing companies to sue in defamation 
conferred certain benefits on them.130 In particular, in Australia, E&W and Canada, defamation 
law presumes both falsity, in that the burden is on the defendant to prove the truth of the 
statement, and damage to reputation131 (although in E&W section 1 of the 2013 Act has 
effectively eliminated the presumption of damages132  and in Australia  section 10A will have 
the same effect). Consequently, compared to the common law and statutory causes of action 
discussed below, prior to the introduction of the section 9 prohibition (and, now, section 10A(1) 
and (2)) in Australia, and the section 1(1) serious harm and section 1(2) serious financial loss 
tests in E&W, this made it relatively easy for companies to bring an action for defamation. This 
remains the case in Canada.   
Malicious falsehood and misleading or deceptive conduct 
As the High Court of Australia judgment in Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Limited v Chesterton133 
points out, defamation protects reputation, whereas injurious falsehood protects the goods, 
services, business or property of the claimant, as opposed to its reputation per se.134 To 
maintain an action for malicious (or injurious) falsehood in all three jurisdictions the claimant 
must show that: (i) the defendant published to third parties words which are false; (ii) that they 
refer to the claimant, or their property or their business; (iii) that they were published 
maliciously; and (iv) that actual damage has followed as a direct and natural result of their 
publication.135 Unlike defamation, with malicious falsehood, the claimant bears the burden of 
proof in relation to the elements of falsity, malice and damage.136 Furthermore, in Australia, 
section 18 of Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 provides a statutory cause 
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of action for misleading or deceptive conduct which can be employed by corporations.137 In 
common with malicious falsehood, a claimant wishing to rely on section 18 bears the burden 
of demonstrating that the publication was likely to mislead or deceive. Additionally, to obtain 
a remedy, they would need to sustain actual damage.138 
 Thus, the section 9 prohibition has effectively forced companies to employ causes of 
action to protect their reputation that, due to their more onerous conditions, were previously 
rarely used for this purpose.139 As argued above, and explored in more detail at section 7 below, 
the introduction of section 10A(2) is unlikely to change this in many cases. For the purposes 
of reputational protection Orion Pet Products Pty Ltd v RSPCA140 animates the disparity 
between the law of defamation, as compared to malicious falsehood and misleading or 
deceptive conduct.141 Orion sued the RSPCA because of comments it made that Orion’s 
electronic dog collars were cruel and ineffective.142 The claim for malicious falsehood failed 
because, although false, the RSPCA’s statements were not malicious.143 The misleading or 
deceptive conduct claim also failed because, according to the court, the RSPCA’s claims were 
genuinely held opinions which were not devoid of any foundation144 and, in any event, were 
published for public education purposes, rather than in the course of trade or commerce.145 To 
the contrary, the defamation claim succeeded.146 This was due to it being relatively easy for 
Orion to establish defamation, but more difficult for the RSPCA to make out their pleaded 
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Publications Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 970;Coe above, n1, 260; Rolph above, n20, 199.  
142 Orion above, n140, per Weinberg J, 195–8. 
143 Ibid. 227. 
144 Ibid. 213–5. 
145 Ibid. 223. 
146 Ibid. 238. Orion was awarded $85,000 in damages. 
147 Ibid. 232–5.  
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7. THE EFFICACY OF THE SERIOUS FINANCIAL LOSS TEST 
In E&W, section 1(1) of the 2013 Act provides that for a statement to be defamatory it must 
have caused, or is likely to cause, the claimant’s reputation serious harm. For bodies that ‘trade 
for profit’ this is qualified by section 1(2), which says that to meet this threshold companies 
need to demonstrate that the statement has caused, or is likely to cause, serious financial loss. 
Neither serious harm nor serious financial loss are defined by the Act. Rather, it has been left 
to case law to provide guidance on what they mean. Despite this, as explained in section 1, in 
Australia, the Council of Attorneys-General used section 1(1) and 1(2), and its judicial 
interpretation, as its model for the section 10A(1) and (2) tests. Thus, through recourse to case 
law the remainder of this section will consider the efficacy of the actual or likely serious 
financial loss test as it applies in E&W and will potentially apply in Australia.148  
(a) Actual or likely serious financial loss 
Pursuant to E&W case law there are four methods for demonstrating serious financial loss. The 
first three methods relate to ‘tangible’ financial loss, whereas the fourth method is more 
abstract, in that it relates to ‘reputational’ loss that can result in financial loss. 
The paradigm example is direct financial loss, in which the claimant may seek to prove 
direct losses caused by the impact of the defamatory statement on customers or clients.149 
Money spent by the claimant on mitigating the damage caused by the statement by, for instance, 
employing a public relations consultant,150 or engaging in ‘counter-publicity’, has also been 
used successfully as evidence to satisfy the test.151 Arguably, wasted management time spent 
dealing with the problems caused by the defamatory statements could also be used, although 
this method is relatively untested.152 Finally, it is submitted that there is precedent, from the 
 
148 For analysis of the serious harm test see: Emma Linch, ‘Defamation Update: Serious Harm, Lachaux and 
Beyond’ Inforrm 4th December 2019 https://inforrm.org/2019/12/04/defamation-update-serious-harm-lachaux-
and-beyond-emma-linch/.  
149 Pursuant to Undre v Harrow [2017] EMLR 3 the losses incurred must relate to a reduction in profit, as opposed 
to turnover. However, such loss can be inferred from relatively slim materials. See Brett Wilson LLP v Persons 
Unknown [2016] 4 WLR 69. 
150 ReachLocal UK Ltd v Bennett [2015] EMLR 7. 
151 By analogy, see Lisle-Mainwaring v Associated Newspapers Ltd & Anor [2017] EWHC 543 (QB), [131]–
[180]. 
152 R+V Versicherung v Risk Insurance & Reinsurance Solutions SA & Others [2006] EWHC 42 (Comm); Hugh 
Tomlinson QC and Guy Vassall-Adams QC (eds), Online Publication Claims: A Practical Guide (Matrix 
Chambers 2017), [5.34]. 
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E&W courts153 and, to an extent, the European Court of Human Rights,154 for a reduction in 
balance sheet ‘goodwill’, that reflects damage to the corporate name and brand, and amounts 
to a loss suffered by the company,155 being used to demonstrate serious financial loss. However, 
this is subject to academic debate and judicial conflict.156  
On the face of it, demonstrating that actual or likely serious financial loss has been 
incurred should be relatively straightforward, especially where one of the first three methods 
relating to ‘tangible’ financial loss has been employed. However, in practice, this is not the 
case. Rather, as discussed below, due to difficulties with establishing causation, particularly 
with the more abstract fourth method, the provision presents a formidable, and very often 
insurmountable, hurdle for corporate claimants to overcome, particularly smaller companies 
that do not have the same financial and legal resources at their disposal as larger companies 
and many defendant organisations.  
(b) Establishing causation: ‘tangible’ financial loss 
In relation to tangible financial loss, it is submitted that there are two issues which, in some 
instances, may prove insurmountable for corporate claimants. 
Firstly, the claimant will need to establish causation by demonstrating that the 
defamatory statement caused or is likely to cause serious financial loss. This would not be an 
issue where, for example, there is one statement clearly linked to an immediate drop in profits. 
However, difficulty arises where a loss has been caused by a number of statements, only one, 
or a selection, of which, is actionable. In this example, to establish causation, the claimant 
would have to prove that the single defamatory statement caused or is likely to cause ‘a’ serious 
financial loss. The second issue is quantifying the loss caused, or likely to be caused, from that 
individual, or selection of, defamatory statement(s). In this example, it may prove impossible 
 
153 For example, see: R (Nicholds) v Security Industry Association [2006] EWHC 1792 (Admin), per Kenneth 
Parker QC, [72] and [73]; R (Malik) v Waltham Forest NHS Primary Care Trust [2007] EWCA Civ 265, per Auld 
J at [23] and [42]. 
154 There is a line of Strasbourg jurisprudence, beginning with Van Marle v Netherlands App. Nos 8543, 8674, 
8675 and 8685/79 (1986) 8 EHRR 483, [63], that determines that the goodwill of a professional practice, or of a 
‘business engaged in commerce’, can be a possession for the purposes of Article 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR. See: 
Peter Coe and James Brown, ‘What’s in a Name? The Case for Protecting the Reputation of Businesses under 
Article 1 Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2019) Journal of European Tort Law 10(3), 
286-315. 
155 To the contrary, pursuant to Collins Stewart v Financial Times Ltd [2005 EMLR 5, reduction in share value is 
not sufficient as share price is not an aspect of goodwill or an asset of the company (see also Dillon LJ’s judgment 
in Lonrho v Fayed (No. 5) [1994]  1 ALL ER 188 196 (a)-(g)).  
156 For analysis of the conflicting case law, particularly from the European Court of Human Rights, see Coe and 
Brown above, n154. 
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for a company to separate what loss is linked to the untrue actionable statement(s) and what is 
linked to other, non-actionable statements, that have caused legitimate damage to its 
reputation.157 Thus, in some instances, corporate claimants will be in the unfortunate position 
of not only facing a protracted and costly challenge to establish a causative link between a 
statement and their actual or likely financial loss, but may also suffer further negative publicity 
as a result their attempt to vindicate their reputation through such protracted litigation.158 
Secondly, serious financial loss to one company would be a minor dent on the balance 
sheet of another. Quantifying serious financial loss in any given case, particularly where that 
loss is potential as opposed to real,159 will be difficult. To date there is no guidance as to what 
the word ‘serious’ means within the context of the section 1(2) test. However, it is submitted 
that, logically, it should be subject to the same interpretation as Section 1(1), albeit what 
amounts to ‘serious’ financial loss should be relative to the size of the company.160  
(c) Establishing causation: ‘loss of goodwill’ 
Section 1(2) and section 10A(2) may prevent companies from pursuing legitimate claims where 
their reputation has been damaged. For example, a company may undertake not-for-profit 
activities as part of its corporate social responsibility (CSR) policy. A defamatory statement in 
relation to these activities may not cost the claimant money in the same way as the examples 
set out in the previous section, but it could depreciate its goodwill, thereby affecting it in its 
‘way of business’.161 In this example, the loss may manifest as an inability to continue certain 
CSR activities, which may, in turn, impact upon the company’s ability to attract and recruit 
talented employees.162 Incidentally, a damaged reputation relating to this type of activity could 
also interfere with marketing campaigns or staff development plans, all of which could have 
an eventual impact on the financial health and prosperity of the company.163 Thus, although, in 
theory, quantifiable economic loss may be caused by, for instance, not being able recruit good 
employees, due to the nature of goodwill being inherently intangible, measuring and 
quantifying the loss and establishing causation with any precision is likely to be an extremely 
 
157 Although mainly concerning malicious falsehood, this point is illustrated by Tesla Motors Limited and Another 
v British Broadcasting Corporation [2013] EWCA Civ 152, per Moore-Bick LJ, [46]. 
158 Ibid. [44]. 
159 See the fourth ‘abstract’ method for demonstrating serious financial loss (a reduction in balance sheet 
‘goodwill’) at section 7(a) above. 
160 Tomlinson and Vassall-Adams above, n152, [5.34].  
161 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] QB 770, 546 per Lord Keith. 
162 Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties (2nd edn, Jordans 2014), 157; Larry Ribstein, ‘Accountability and 
Responsibility in Corporate Governance’ (2006) 81 Notre Dame Law Review 1431, 1457–1458. 
163 Ibid.   
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difficult hurdle for a claimant to overcome, both practically and economically: in this case, 
demonstrating actual or likely serious financial loss by virtue of the loss of goodwill may only 
be achieved by, for example, establishing a link between the statement and consequent inability 
to recruit suitable employees which causes economic harm. Evidentially this would be hugely 
challenging, particularly for smaller companies with less financial means and legal resources, 
as it would be subject to issues of remoteness, reliability, and certainty, due to the variable 
factors that would be involved.164   
(d) A road to nowhere? 
Not all corporations that have been subject to alleged defamatory imputations are in a sufficient 
financial position to fund prolonged litigation, even if they have a realistic prospect of 
succeeding.165 To the contrary not all defendants are financially disadvantaged, as they may, 
for instance, include large media corporations.166 Consequently, where the claimant is a small 
company there is arguably significant potential for the section 1(2) and section 10A(2) serious 
financial loss qualifications to disproportionately disadvantage corporate claimants. This added 
complexity of proving actual or likely serious financial loss only serves to lengthen litigation 
further. The acute difficulty with establishing causation means that corporate claimants face 
the prospect of having their claims struck out, due to their being no reasonable grounds 
disclosed for bringing the claim, pursuant to rule 3.4(2)(a) of the E&W Civil Procedure Rules 
(CPR), and for displaying no reasonable cause of action pursuant to rule 14.28 of the Uniform 
Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) in Australia. Equally, E&W claimants are exposed to 24.2 CPR 
applications for summary judgment, on the basis that there is no real prospect of being able to 
demonstrate at trial that it has suffered any quantifiable loss by reason of actionable 
statements.167 For the same reasons, in Australia, claimants will be exposed to rule 13.4(1) 
UCPR summary dismissal applications.  
Consequently, it is submitted that the threat of increasingly protracted litigation, and 
the sheer complexity of establishing that the serious harm caused to the company’s reputation 
emanated from a particular statement, will deter some companies, particularly smaller entities, 
from pursuing a defamation claim, even if they have a realistic (or better) prospect of 
 
164 For example, establishing that a potential employee chose to look elsewhere for employment due to the 
defamatory statement; or, that an employee’s performance is below that of a potential employee who would have 
applied for a position within the company, but for the statement, and that performance shortfall has had, or is 
likely to have, a negative financial impact.  
165 Gary Chan, ‘Corporate Defamation: Reputation, Rights and Remedies’ (2013) 33(2) Legal Studies 268, 281. 
166 Ibid. 
167 See Tesla above n157; Coe above, n29, 332-333. 
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succeeding, due to the costs involved and the resources required. The position is worse for 
corporate claimants where they have suffered a loss of goodwill. In these situations, it will be 
practically very difficult and / or simply uneconomic, to attempt vindicate their reputation using 
defamation.  
Ultimately, this may result in claims for defamation being brought by individuals 
associated with the ‘defamed’ company, such as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), or an 
individual named in the alleged defamatory statement. In this instance, unless it was clear that 
the allegation only criticised the company, the individual could argue that the statement 
identified and defamed them. Notwithstanding the fact that this is more likely to occur with 
smaller companies, where individuals are more closely associated with the company itself, by 
bringing an action in this way the serious financial loss requirement is circumvented, although 
the individual would still have to satisfy the serious harm requirement. This is not an ideal 
situation for two reasons.  Firstly, if the individual is successful, damages may be recovered. 
However, because the action would have been brought by the individual rather than the 
company, its reputation is less likely to have been explicitly vindicated. Secondly, claims 
brought by an individual, such as the CEO, effectively suing to seek vindication of the 
company’s reputation, may be treated by the courts as an abuse of process.168  
 
8. CONCLUSION: ELIMINATING THE PRESUMPTION OF FALSITY FOR 
CORPORATE DEFAMATION CLAIMANTS - AN ALTERNATIVE WAY FORWARD? 
The use of SLAPP litigation by Canadian corporations to silence defamatory and non-
defamatory criticism of businesses animates the need for a regime that is more protective of 
speech about corporations and corporate conduct than is currently in place in Canada. To the 
contrary, using an arbitrary number of employees to determine which companies can and 
cannot sue in defamation is problematic. In the case of the section 9 prohibition, it provides 
inadequate protection for companies generally and, particularly, for many typical small 
companies. Yet, paradoxically, it can disproportionately protect small yet wealthy companies 
(subject to overcoming the section 10A(2) serious harm and serious financial loss tests). It has 
also been asserted that removing the presumption of damage, and requiring claimants to prove 
they have suffered actual or likely serious financial loss creates what can be potentially 
 
168 Coe above, n29, 332. 
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insurmountable hurdles to establishing causation for companies of all sizes, but are particularly 
difficult for smaller companies to overcome. This is because: (i) larger companies are able to 
use non-legal methods which are not typically available to smaller companies; (ii) smaller 
companies do not have the financial and legal resources to help them overcome the challenges 
presented by the serious financial loss qualification.  
 However, it is easy to assert that, on the one hand, the Canadian position overprotects 
corporations, and on the other hand, the Australian and E&W positions disproportionately 
disadvantage businesses. Much more challenging questions to answer are: how can a balance 
between protecting corporate reputation using defamation and protecting free speech be 
achieved and, therefore, what alternative is there to the Canadian, Australian and E&W 
approaches that could create a more appropriate balance between these conflicting interests?   
According to Milo the presumption of falsity in favour of defamation claimants 
illustrates the ‘primacy of reputation over free speech at common law.’169 It is submitted that a 
way to achieve a more appropriate balance between these interests would be to eliminate the 
presumption of falsity for corporate defamation claimants;170 thereby reversing the existing 
burden of proof by requiring businesses to establish that a defamatory statement of fact is 
untrue, or that a defamatory comment is unfair. At first glance this suggestion may seem to 
contradict the arguments made earlier in this article relating to the appropriateness of injurious 
falsehood as an alternative cause of action to defamation.171 However, unlike injurious 
falsehood, which presents claimants with the onerous requirement of proving three ‘elements’: 
falsity, maliciousness and damage, this would only require falsity to be established. It is 
submitted that, unlike proving damage by establishing actual or likely serious financial loss, 
which we have seen creates significant challenges for claimants, this would not be an 
unsurmountable hurdle for businesses with genuine claims to overcome.172 Indeed, this is borne 
out by empirical research from the United States following the case of Philadelphia 
Newspapers Incorporated v Hepps173 in which it was found that, in a substantial number of 
cases, claimants were successful in establishing falsity, or at least raising material issues 
 
169 Milo above, n95, 168. 
170 This corresponds with the position in the United States. See: Philadelphia Newspapers Incorporated et al v 
Hepps et al 475 US 767 (1986). However, in Canada, it was said in Pressler v Lethbridge (1997) 153 DLR (4th) 
537 that the common law presumption of falsity does not violate the Canadian Charter of Rights, and is too well 
established to be changed except by the Supreme Court (Bank of British Columbia v Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (1993) 108 DLR (4th) 178).   
171 See section 6. 
172 Milo above, n95, 166-167. 
173 475 US 767 (1986). 
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relating to falsity that enabled them to resist summary judgment applications.174 Consequently, 
it would provide an appropriate ‘check and balance’ mechanism on corporations that protects 
free speech whilst, at the same time, not presenting an overly burdensome hurdle for businesses 
with meritorious claims to overcome.  
It is submitted that requiring corporate claimants to establish the falsity of a statement 
or the unfairness of a comment can benefit businesses in a way that is not immediately obvious. 
The presumption of falsity means that the onus is on the defendant to prove truth or fairness. 
If they are unable to do this then it is presumed that the statement is false or unfair. Under these 
circumstances the claimant essentially remains ‘in neutral’ and does not have to proactively 
vindicate their reputation. It is not inconceivable that from an outsider’s perspective (and for 
companies this could mean their current or potential customers or clients) this may appear as 
though the only reason the claimant was successful was because the defendant was unable, in 
that instance, to establish truth or fairness, as opposed to the statement or comment definitively 
being untrue or unfair. Therefore, this can result in negative as opposed to positive victories 
for claimants, as although they have technically won the case, their reputations are not 
objectively vindicated. To the contrary, a proactive requirement on claimants to prove truth or 
fairness overcomes this issue with ‘negative victories.’175   
In conclusion, the distinct approaches adopted in Australia, E&W and Canada are 
problematic because they either over-protect corporate reputation, or disproportionately 
disadvantage companies, particularly small ones. Striking a perfect balance between 
appropriately protecting corporate reputation and protecting free speech is, probably, 
impossible. Rather, the best we can hope for is an imperfect balance using what is an imperfect 
solution. However, it is submitted that for the reasons advanced in this article the alternative 
way forward that it has been suggested above achieves a better balance for both rights than is 




174 Brian J. Steffan ‘The Falsity Burden of Private Libel Plaintiffs since Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc v Hepps’ 
(1994) 16(3) Communications and the Law 57-82.  
175 In Post’s view ‘[t]he issue of truth is essential to a plaintiff’s rehabilitation…’: Post above, n84, 713; 
Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (Oxford University Press, 2007), 52.  
